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In this chapter I begin by reviewing common definitions of terrorism to 
show the popularity of assuming that terrorists intend to coerce govern-
ments and their citizens through fear. Then I draw out some of the costs of 
this assumption for both analysts of terrorism and practitioners of counter-
terrorism. In particular I argue that the predominant reaction to terrorism 
is not fear but anger, and that terrorists aim to elicit anger and overreaction 
in order to gain support for their cause, a strategy Sophia Moskalenko and 
I have called jujitsu politics.
defining terrorism as intent to coerce by fear
It is no secret that there has been grave difficulty in finding agreement on 
a definition of terrorism. It is perhaps more surprising to note the degree to 
which Western definitions share the idea that terrorists aim to create fear 
in order to coerce a government or its citizens. In other words, terrorists are 
those who aim to terrorize. Some salient definitions of terrorism are repre-
sented in this section to show the popularity of defining terrorism by 
intent; the relevant part of each definition is represented in bold.
Proposed United Nations Comprehensive 
Convention on International Terrorism
1.  Any person commits an offence within the meaning of this 
Convention if that person, by any means, unlawfully and 
intentionally, causes:
(a) Death or serious bodily injury to any person; or
(b)  Serious damage to public or private property, including a place of 
public use, a State or government facility, a public transportation 
system, an infrastructure facility or the environment; or
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(c)  Damage to property, places, facilities, or systems referred to in 
paragraph 1 (b) of this article, resulting or likely to result in 
major economic loss, when the purpose of the conduct, by its 
nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to com-
pel a Government or an international organization to do or 
abstain from doing any act.1
Because of disagreement about whether this definition would apply to gov-
ernment forces and government leaders, this definition has been under dis-
cussion at the United Nations since 2002.2
United Kingdom
The United Kingdom’s Terrorism Act 2000 defined terrorism as follows:
(1) In this Act “terrorism” means the use or threat of action where:
(a) the action falls within subsection (2),
(b) t he use or threat is designed to influence the government 
or to intimidate the public or a section of the public and
(c)  the use or threat is made for the purpose of advancing a politi-
cal, religious or ideological cause.
(2) Action falls within this subsection if it:
(a) involves serious violence against a person,
(b) involves serious damage to property,
(c) endangers a person’s life, other than that of the person commit-
ting the action,
(d) creates a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or a 
section of the public or
(e) is designed seriously to interfere with or seriously to disrupt an 
electronic system.”3
US Definitions
Title 22 of the US Code of Federal Regulations, Section 2656f(d), defines 
terrorism as “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated 
against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, 
usually intended to influence an audience.”4 The US State Department uses 
this definition for its yearly reports on terrorist activity, and the CIA like-
wise uses this definition.
The US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) defines terrorism as “the 
unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to 
Stohl - Constructions of Terrorism.indd   80 10/04/17   5:47 PM
Constructing Terrorism    /    81
intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any 
segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives.”5
The US Department of Defense defines terrorism as “the unlawful use 
of violence or threat of violence to instill fear and coerce govern-
ments or societies. Terrorism is often motivated by religious, political, or 
other ideological beliefs and committed in the pursuit of goals that are usu-
ally political.”6
The US Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) also has a 
definition of terrorism:
the use of force or violence against persons or property in violation of 
the criminal laws of the United States for purposes of intimidation, 
coercion, or ransom. Terrorists often use threats to:
• Create fear among the public.
• Try to convince citizens that their government is powerless to pre-
vent terrorism.
• Get immediate publicity for their causes.7
The USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 defines domestic terrorism as “activities 
that (A) involve acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the 
criminal laws of the United States or of any state; (B) appear to be 
intended (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii) to influ-
ence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) 
to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or 
kidnapping; and (C) occur primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the 
U.S.”8
The Department of Homeland Security, in the law creating DHS, defines 
terrorism as “any activity that—(A) involves an act that—(i) is dangerous 
to human life or potentially destructive of critical infrastructure or key 
resources; and (ii) is a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or 
of any State or other subdivision of the United States; and (B) appears to 
be intended—(i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii) to 
influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or 
(iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assas-
sination, or kidnapping.”9
Of these eight definitions of terrorism, seven include terrorist motivation 
to intimidate, coerce, or compel. Two of the US definitions, from the US 
Department of Defense and the US Federal Emergency Management 
Agency, refer explicitly to coercion by fear. Only one definition, in the US 
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Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), does not refer to intimidation and coer-
cion: “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-
combatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually 
intended to influence an audience.”
The US CFR definition is notably close to Martha Crenshaw’s 1995 def-
inition: “Terrorism is a conspiratorial style of violence calculated to alter 
the attitudes and behavior of multitude audiences. It targets the few in a 
way that claims the attention of the many. Terrorism is not mass or collec-
tive violence but rather the direct activity of small groups.”10
what do terrorists want?
Terror as a tactic of political conflict and political control goes far back in 
history, notably in the actions of states seeking to control citizens or sub-
jects. Thus the Romans lined roads with crosses bringing agonizing death 
to “bandits” who today might be called terrorists. Naming this tactic terror-
ism goes back only to the French Revolution, in which the new government 
embraced killing of aristocrats, clerics, and even peasants loyal to the old 
regime. “Kill one man, frighten a thousand” may be the shortest descrip-
tion of terror as a political tactic.
As states through history have used terror to coerce, compel, and intim-
idate, states facing nonstate violence find it an obvious assumption that 
coercion based on fear is what the terrorist threat is about. This easy projec-
tion of state motives to terrorist motives must be resisted, however, because 
it has several unhelpful consequences.
The first consequence is to make terrorist motivations difficult to ana-
lyze. When one among many possible motives for a terrorist attack is 
included in the definition of terrorism, all other possibilities tend to vanish. 
For this reason, no social scientist would put a hypothetical explanation of 
a phenomenon in the definition of the phenomenon of interest.
For instance, if we were interested in why people give to charity, it would 
not be helpful to define giving to charity as a behavior based on intent to 
help others. Such a definition would make other possible intentions disap-
pear. What if some people give to charity to gain the admiration of others 
or to avoid being seen as stingy and selfish? Similarly, terrorists may have 
many motives other than coercion, including such individualist motives as 
revenge, thrill-seeking, and status. It is perhaps an indicator of the status of 
social science in government offices that so many government definitions 
of terrorism enshrine one possible motive for terrorism in the very defini-
tion of terrorism.
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A second consequence of identifying terrorism with coercion is that the 
competition between terrorist groups becomes invisible. When groups 
advancing the same political cause are in competition for the same base of 
sympathizers and supporters, these groups are likely to escalate gradually 
to more extreme tactics. Mia Bloom has called this kind of competition 
outbidding. If one group begins using suicide bombers, for instance, com-
peting groups are likely to follow.
Outbidding violence can often be identified in the locations and timing of 
attacks. This is the case for attacks in Paris attributed to al-Qaeda and the 
Islamic State. On January 7, 2015, Saïd and Chérif Kouachi killed eleven 
people in the Paris offices of the French satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo. 
They credited their training and support to al-Qaeda in Yemen. At almost 
the same time, between January 7 and 9, 2015, Amedy Coulibaly killed a 
policeman and four people in a Jewish kosher grocery store in Paris. He 
credited the Islamic State for his inspiration.11 The rivalry between al-Qaeda 
and the Islamic State has been seen also in attacks in Yemen and Mali.12
Violence motivated by competition among militant groups is invisible 
when our view of terrorism begins and ends in coercion of those attacked. 
For outbidding violence, the intended audience is not the government or 
citizens attacked, but those who already sympathize with the terrorist cause.
A third consequence of identifying terrorism with coercion is that fear 
becomes the key emotion for understanding and resisting terrorism. 
Terrorists want to terrorize! If the target of terrorist attacks, both the gov-
ernment and its citizens, can resist fear and intimidation, the terrorists can-
not succeed. And how better to demonstrate the conquest of fear than to 
strike back against the terrorists, to mobilize new resources to fight terror-
ism, to strengthen government power to fight terrorism—in short, to 
declare war on terrorism. Unfortunately for this simple view, terrorists 
count on anger and outrage at least as much as they count on fear, as will 
be discussed in the following section.
A fourth consequence of including fear and coercion in government 
definitions is that citizens are misled about the danger that terrorism poses. 
This is a mass psychology problem, not a problem for specialists and ana-
lysts. Many who study terrorism, inside government as well as outside, 
understand that fear and coercion are not the only goals of terrorist attacks. 
But the citizens who read and hear government definitions of terrorism, 
especially as these are embodied in the opinions of politicians and pundits, 
believe that, if they do not give in to fear and if they support war against 
terrorists, they have done their best. The next section shows the costs of 
this misplaced confidence.
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beyond coercion: jujitsu politics
Decades of research with small face-to-face groups have shown that out-
group threat leads to increased group cohesion, increased respect for ingroup 
leaders, increased sanctions for ingroup deviates, and idealization of ingroup 
norms. In larger groups, reference to cohesion is often replaced with refer-
ences to ingroup identification, patriotism, or nationalism, but the pattern in 
response to outgroup threat is similar to that seen in small groups.
Consider the changes brought to US politics after the terrorist attacks of 
September 2001: increased patriotism visible in rallies, flags, banners, and 
bumper stickers; polls showing increased support for the president and for 
every agent and agency of government; increased sanctions for Americans 
challenging the consensus (Bill Maher sacked for suggesting the 9/11 
attackers were not cowards); and reification of American values (“They 
hate us for our values”).
Consider also the emotions associated with the 9/11 attacks. An innova-
tive study by Back, Kufner, and Egloff examined emotion words in millions 
of words of texts sent in the United States on September 11, 2001.13 Anger-
related words increased throughout the day, their incidence ending six 
times higher than that of fear- and sadness-related words.
Anger and fear have different action tendencies. Experiments described 
by Wetherell and colleagues show that individuals responding with anger 
to images of the 9/11 attacks are more likely to favor aggressive reactions 
to terrorism, whereas reactions of fear and sadness are related to support 
for more defensive reactions.14 Across several studies Wetherell et al. found 
that anger reactions are related to support for attacking terrorist leaders in 
foreign countries, support for war against countries harboring terrorists, 
and outgroup derogation of Arab Americans and Palestinians. In other 
studies fear reactions were associated with increased support for govern-
ment surveillance and restriction of civil liberties.
In short, the predominant US reaction to the 9/11 attacks was not fear, 
but anger. Anger is associated with aggression and outgroup derogation; 
fear is associated with defensive strategies of surveillance and curtailed civil 
rights. Anger is the emotion sought by terrorists aiming to elicit overreac-
tion to their attacks—using the enemy’s strength against him in a strategy 
of jujitsu politics.15 The power of this strategy, and the importance of anger 
reactions in making the strategy successful, is hidden by definitions of ter-
rorism that focus only on fear and coercion.
Al-Qaeda had good reason to be hopeful that jujitsu politics would work 
for them on 9/11.
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In 1986, the United States attempted to reply to Libyan-supported ter-
rorism by bombing Libya’s leader, Muammar al-Qaddafi. The bombs 
missed Qaddafi but a bomb or two did hit an apartment building and killed 
a number of civilians. This mistake was downplayed in the United States, 
but it was a public-relations success for anti-US groups across North Africa.
In 1998 the United States attempted to reply to al-Qaeda attacks on US 
embassies in Africa by sending cruise missiles against a weapons factory in 
Sudan and against al-Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan. It turned out 
that the weapons factory was making medical supplies—more fuel for anti-
US feelings. Worse yet, the cruise missiles landing in Afghanistan blew off 
the table a deal in which Afghanistan’s Taliban would turn over Osama bin 
Laden and other of his troublesome Arab colleagues to Saudi Arabia—
where the Saudi royals were still smarting from bin Laden’s criticism.
Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri enunciated the strategy of jujitsu politics in his 
memoir Knights under the Prophet’s Banner.
The masters in Washington and Tel Aviv are using the apostate Muslim 
regimes to protect their interests and to fight the battle against the 
Muslims on their behalf. If the shrapnel from the battle reach their 
homes and bodies, they will trade accusations with their agents about 
who is responsible for this. In that case, they will face one of two bitter 
choices: either personally wage the battle against the Muslims, which 
means that the battle will turn into clear-cut jihad against infidels, or 
they reconsider their plans after acknowledging the failure of the brute 
and violent confrontation against Muslims.16
Al-Zawahiri argues that if the shrapnel of war reaches American homes, 
Americans must either give up their control of Muslim countries or come 
out from behind their Muslim stooges to fight for control. But if American 
troops move into Muslim countries, these troops would become a magnet 
for jihad of the kind the Russians faced in Afghanistan. Although the US 
war against the Taliban was faster and cleaner of collateral damage to civil-
ians than al-Qaeda had expected, the US move into Iraq did indeed bring 
out more terrorists, both in Muslim and in Western countries.
More recently, jujitsu politics is part of the motivation behind the ISIS-
sponsored attacks in Paris on November 13, 2015, which killed 130 and 
wounded 367, as well as the Brussels attacks on March 22, 2016, which 
killed 32 and injured more than 300. These attacks left a big question: Why 
would a group aiming for a Sunni state in Syria and Iraq, a group already 
under attack by the government forces of Syria, the United States, the 
United Kingdom, France, and Russia, mount a terrorist attack in Paris or 
Brussels?
Stohl - Constructions of Terrorism.indd   85 10/04/17   5:47 PM
86    /    Clark McCauley
Every terrorist attack and every counterterrorist response is a commu-
nication to multiple audiences. We need to look at these audiences sepa-
rately to see the logic of the Paris attacks.
For Sunni Muslims chafing under Shi’a power in Iraq and Syria, the 
message is power. ISIS can best defend Sunnis because ISIS has the power. 
For young Sunni men in the Middle East, the message is “Don’t think about 
joining ‘moderate’ Sunni rebels; don’t think about joining a local tribal 
militia; join the winning team—join ISIS.”
For Muslims in Europe there is also a message of power, but more 
important, there is jujitsu politics—ISIS trying to use Western strength 
against the West. A response to terrorism that creates collateral damage, 
that harms individuals previously unsympathetic to the terrorists, can 
bring new status and new volunteers for the terrorists.
This is the result ISIS sought from the Paris and Brussels attacks. In 
France and in other European countries, ISIS aimed for a government 
response that would target Muslims with new restrictions and new surveil-
lance. ISIS hoped also for a public reaction against Muslims and the 
strengthening of anti-immigrant political parties, not only in France but in 
other European countries as well. They wanted increased discrimination 
and hostility aimed at European Muslims.
In short, ISIS looked and is still looking for European reactions to push 
European Muslims toward joining in the construction of a new caliphate. 
There are more than 20 million Muslims living in the European Union. So 
far perhaps 2,000 have traveled to Syria to join ISIS. Jujitsu politics can 
bring more volunteers, more home-grown terrorists, and more security 
costs for European countries.
Will it work? Political speeches and newspapers are full of war talk. 
French forces have joined with US forces in dropping more bombs on the 
areas of Syria and Iraq controlled by the Islamic State. As Islamic State 
fighters try to blend in with civilians, the escalation of bombing means 
escalation of collateral damage.
In France new powers of investigation and detention have been advanced 
for use by police and security forces. These will be felt more in Muslim 
immigrant neighborhoods than elsewhere. The French parliament in May 
2016 approved another two-month extension of the state of emergency 
that curtails civil liberties. “The state of emergency,” the New York Times 
reported, “had enabled the authorities to put people under house arrest and 
to carry out police raids without the prior authorization of a judge. Sixty-
nine people are currently under house arrest . . . and more than 3,500 raids 
have been carried out since Nov. 14.”17
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Perhaps the most dangerous force for hostility and discrimination is the 
definition of the enemy as “fundamentalist Muslims.” Marine Le Pen, 
leader of an anti-immigrant party in France, offered this target in an inter-
view with NPR’s Robert Siegel: “And we must eradicate Islamic fundamen-
talism from our soil.”18 Siegel did not challenge Le Pen’s definition of the 
problem. But the fact is that the great majority of Islamic fundamentalists 
are devout, rather than political. Defining religious ideas and religious prac-
tice as the enemy will attack ninety-nine peaceful Muslims for every jihad-
ist reached. Jujitsu politics will be winning.
Even better for ISIS than training and supporting people to attack in 
Western countries is inspiring homegrown attackers to claim allegiance to 
ISIS. Syed Rizwan Farook and Tashfeen Malik began preparing for their 
December 2015 attack in San Bernardino before ISIS hit the news in sum-
mer 2014, but their last-minute invocation of “Islamic State” was enough 
to raise the brand name in American eyes. Similarly, Omar Mateen claimed 
allegiance to the Islamic State in a 911 call made during his June 2016 
attacks in Orlando; most news media accounted him an Islamic terrorist 
despite his history of mental health problems and despite his having chosen 
a target—Latino gays—that undermined the political significance of his 
attack.19
Despite the fuzzy motivations of the attackers, these two attacks have 
been credited to Muslim extremism in general and to the Islamic State in 
particular. We need to ask why it is so easy to turn the actions of a few 
individuals into calls for excluding Muslims from the United States, profil-
ing Muslims already living in the United States, and increasing public hos-
tility toward Muslims.20 When and why is it easy to project onto the many 
the actions of a few? Research in this direction is urgently needed, but it is 
already clear that an important part of the power of jujitsu politics is our 
easy projection from the actions of a few terrorists to suspicion of the whole 
group the terrorists claim they represent.
counterterrorism: a dynamic perspective
Jujitsu politics points to the importance of action and reaction in the conflict 
between terrorists and their targets. Overreaction to a terrorist attack pro-
duces its own reaction in escalated sympathy and support for the terrorists. 
In turn, terrorists escalate their attacks or broaden their targets. Action and 
reaction produce a trajectory of escalating violence over time.
To understand terrorism is to understand this trajectory. It is not possi-
ble to understand or anticipate terrorist actions without understanding how 
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terrorists see and respond to government actions. Studying the terrorists 
“out there” is a mirage: they do not exist out there; they exist in a dynamic 
relation with us, their targets. This is a difficult perspective for officials and 
officers charged with fighting terrorism to take. To get into the mind of a 
terrorist can make it more difficult to shoot one. To get into the mind of a 
terrorist can raise doubts about what we, the terrorists’ targets, may have 
done to instigate terrorist attack.
Returning now to the popularity of definitions of terrorism that assume 
that terrorists aim to terrorize, it becomes clear how these definitions can 
blind analysts, officials, and citizens alike to the danger of overreaction. If 
terrorists want to coerce us with fear, then we will be safe so long as we are 
not intimidated and fight back. But if we do not see the power in the 
dynamics of interaction, we cede this power to the terrorists, who are 
pleased that we do not understand their best weapon.
Why are we so easily blinded? Defining terrorism as an attempt to 
coerce with fear is part of the answer, but the definition itself requires 
explanation. What is the attraction of a definition that appears ignorant or 
bizarre to any social scientist? It is possible that our blindness arises from 
some cognitive deficit associated with asymmetric conflict or from some 
form of cognitive bias in attributions about intergroup violence. But, as 
already suggested in relation to getting into the mind of the terrorist, there 
is a simpler possibility.
Perhaps ours is a motivated blindness. Not seeing terrorism as interac-
tion saves our self-image as blameless victims and eases our way to violence 
as retribution for terrorist violence. Our retribution can include not just 
boots on the ground but assassination from the air and torture in a prison. 
Seeing conflict as an interaction humanizes the enemy; heroic resistance to 
fear and coercion makes the enemy into monsters.
Here it is useful to note the strong parallel between counterterrorism 
and counterinsurgency. The US Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency 
Field Manual pays close attention to the insurgent strategy that aims to 
mobilize new support by eliciting government overreaction to insurgent 
attacks.21 The need to counter this strategy of jujitsu politics comes through 
in the first five “Paradoxes of Counterinsurgency Operations”:
 1. Sometimes, the more you protect your force, the less secure you 
may be.
 2. Sometimes, the more force is used, the less effective it is.
 3. The more successful the counterinsurgency is, the less force can be 
used and the more risk must be accepted.
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 4. Sometimes doing nothing is the best reaction.
 5. Some of the best weapons for counterinsurgents do not shoot.22
Insurgency and terrorism are forms of political conflict. Counterinsurgency 
and counterterrorism are thus also forms of political conflict. Mao Zedong’s 
slogan is perhaps the shortest summary of the road to success for both 
counterinsurgency and counterterrorism: Politics takes command! For ana-
lysts of terrorism and practitioners of counterterrorism, a more political 
and interactive perspective requires going beyond definitions of terrorism 
that focus only on fear and coercion. For citizens of a democratic state, 
increased resistance to jujitsu politics similarly requires getting beyond the 
idea that we have nothing to fear but fear.
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